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MEASUREMENT OF CHANGE UNDER THE CULTIVATION 
SYSTEM IN JAVA, 1837-1851*
Robert Van Niel
This paper is an attempt to determine some of the social and eco­
nomic impacts of the Cultivation System in Java through the use of 
statistical information contained in reports prepared by government 
officers at the time the System operated. Such information has not 
hitherto been used in this way. This paper is meant as an exploration 
of the possible uses of this type of information. The nature of this 
information, and the fashion in which it is used, will be made clear 
as the paper progresses.
The Cultivation System was introduced in Java in 1830 with the 
arrival of its enthusiastic creator, Johannes van den Bosch. In the 
previous year King William I had charged van den Bosch with putting 
into operation the scheme he had devised for making the island of 
Java produce commodities which would be salable on the world markets. * 1 
The Netherlands1 government had been singularly unsuccessful in ex­
tracting profit from Java since its return from British control in 
1816. Now van den Bosch1s scheme promised to change all that. It 
was a plan of ingenious simplicity that recommended itself to the 
King, and van den Bosch had been dispatched to Java as the new 
Governor-General.
Unlike earlier schemes which viewed the economic productivity of 
Java in terms either of individual enterprise on the part of the 
Javanese or of stimulation by European entrepreneurs, van den Bosch’s 
notion was essentially a governmental-administrative enterprise. 
Traditional patterns of authority, obligation, tribute, and service 
were to be harnessed into a productive pattern which would be guided 
by the traditional Javanese administrative elite with some advice 
and control by a small corps of European administrators. Despite 
van den Bosch’s protestations that participation in the scheme would 
be completely voluntary on the part of the Javanese villagers, many 
of his compatriots entertained grave doubts about the freedom of 
choice which would be allowed under such control in Java. Before he 
even arrived in Java, van den Bosch was being criticized for
* The collection of the basic data from archives in the Netherlands 
was made possible by a grant from the Joint Committee on Asian 
Studies of the ACLSSSRC; assistance in collating and transcribing 
the information came from the University of Hawaii Research Council; 
preparation and programming for computerization was assisted by the 
Social Science Research Institute of the University of Hawaii. I 
am indebted to Miss Karen Essene for assistance in programming.
1. Van den Bosch’s original advice to the King, dated March 6 , 1829, 
is reprinted in an appendix of D. C. Steijn Parve, Het Koloniaal 
Monopoliesteisel Getoetst aan Geschiedenis en Staatshuisoudkunde 
(Zalt-Bommel: Noman, 1851), pp. 294-328.
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reintroducing the old VOC system of monopoly and rigid mercantile 
control. This criticism was highlighted by the resignation of the 
Minister of Industry and Colonies, C. Th. Elout, a strong proponent 
of liberal economic principles. 2 But van den Bosch's blandishments 
had persuaded the King that coercion would not be the keystone of 
the System and that it would provide the long anticipated profits 
while actually raising the welfare of the Javanese.
Van den Bosch's plan was simply that the Javanese village 
set aside a portion of its land, normally one-fifth, for the plant­
ing and tending of a crop or crops designated by the government. The 
produce of this portion of the village's land was to be delivered to 
the government at a fixed price. This price should, according to 
van den Bosch's calculations, have been sufficient to pay the land- 
rent owed by the entire village. Since the land-rent was normally 
calculated at two-fifths of the yield of the village's major crop 
(usually rice), and since van den Bosch constantly asserted that the 
new crop would require no more work than rice, the logical conclusion 
was that the village would have more lands for its own use and would 
benefit from the application of the System. 3 4
Van den Bosch also made reference to a commitment of work which 
the Javanese was expected to devote to the System. The labor compon­
ent of the plan was most vague. It is generally assumed that this 
labor would be used in planting, tending, and cutting the crop planted 
for the government as well as in preparing the land, opening new 
lands, and extending the areas of irrigated land. It would also seem 
that this amount of labor was the equivalent of traditional corvSe 
services. Obligatory labor of various sorts is, and was, a complicated 
matter in the Javanese context; the exact dimension of the additional 
or equivalent labor under the Cultivation System has remained one of 
its most obscure aspects. Van den Bosch said little enough about it, 
for he was sensitive to the allegation of compulsion. Moreover, he 
probably had little idea what was actually happening at the local 
level.*
2. Extensive powers were given van den Bosch by the King in a secret 
decree of June 9, 1829; at that time Elout submitted his resigna­
tion. Elout had been the highest placed critic of van den Bosch's 
policies, and during the months of March, April, and May 1829, the 
two had waged a memoranda debate. The King's decision to support 
van den Bosch was taken at a conference on May 23, 1829, at which 
time a new fundamental law for the Indies was drafted. See further, 
J. J. Westendorp Boerma, Een Geestdriftig Nederlander: Johannes
van den Bosch (Amsterdam: Querido, 1950)7 pp. 70-71.
3. The best general accounts in English of the System are found in 
Clive Day, The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java 
(New York: Macmillan, 1904), pp. 249-342, and J. S. Furnivall, 
Netherlands India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944), 
pp. 115-173. these two accounts differ in interpretation rather 
than substance. My emphasis and interpretation is slightly dif­
ferent from either, but the basic facts remain much the same.
4. In the report of his accomplishments, Mijne Verrigtingen in Indib 
(Amsterdam: Muller, 1864), pp. 423-437, van den Bosch continuously 
speaks of four men (i.e., four families) per bouw of sugar or 
indigo, but there must have been much more labor than this drawn 
into the System. W. Ph. Coolhaas, "Nederlands-IndiS van 1830 tot
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The products delivered to the government by this scheme were to 
receive sufficient processing in factories or mills established with 
government loans to make them exportable. The processing plants were 
in the hands of Europeans and Chinese and worked with paid labor, 
although probably not entirely free labor. The processed commodities 
were shipped to the Netherlands in ships chartered by the Netherlands 
Trading Company (NHM), a government concern founded in 1825 in an 
unsuccessful effort to compete with English shipping. Slowly van den 
Bosch's System brought life into the NHM as the transportation, insur­
ance, and marketing profits began to mount. Within the Netherlands 
itself the products of Java were auctioned into international channels. 
Gradually a new prosperity began to be felt; it was a prosperity that 
was supposed to have benefited everyone from the Javanese peasant to 
the Amsterdam merchant.
The element of the System above the level of the Javanese producer 
is not the primary concern of this paper, but it is well to keep in 
mind that van den Bosch's scheme comprised rather wide-ranging goals.
In practice, there was too little concern with high ideals at the 
lower levels of the System, and the growing criticism of the System 
after the mid-1840's probably reflects with some accuracy the baleful 
effects which the System was having on Javanese society. Since 
much of the writing about the System has been by its opponents these 
failures were often drawn out of context, and there has never been 
an attempt (nor perhaps has it been possible) to measure the extent 
and form of the impact of the System.
One of the chief problems in understanding the Cultivation System 
derives from the fact that critics and proponents have taken it literally 
as a system. Actually from the moment of inception it began to function 
as a series of local arrangements designed to get production moving.
Van den Bosch was most sensitive to the criticism that in the early 
years his System derived its profits from coffee cultivation which 
had been the mainstay of the export economy before his arrival. 5 6 As 
a matter of fact, coffee remained the most profitable single export 
throughout the life of the System, but not for lack of efforts to
1887," Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (Utrecht: de Haan, 1955), 
vol. X, pp. 238-243, states that the Javanese was supposed to give 
up one-fifth of his land and one-fifth of his labor time for the 
cultivation of exportable crops.
5. G. H. van Soest, Geschiedenis van het Kultuurstelsel, 3 vols. 
(Rotterdam: Nijgh, 1869-71), is a rather thorough compilation of 
mistakes and abuses. The broader implications of the System as 
well as the mounting pressures upon the Javanese cultivator are " 
discussed in W. M. F. Mansvelt, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij (Haarlem: Ensched§, [1924]) , vol. II, esp. 
pp. 48-50.
6 . The anonymous book Kort Overzigt der Financiele Resultaten van het 
Stelsel van Kultures (Kampen: n.p., 1835), makes this point. As I 
have shown in my "Function of Landrent Under the Cultivation System 
in Java," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, no. 3 (May 1964), n. 27, 
p. 362, the book was authored by P. Merkus who was at the time a 
member of the Council of the Indies. He carried this argument 
forward in the 1840's in a letter to the Minister of Colonies,
April 22, 1844, Geheim, Kabinet no. 85, at the time he was Governor- 
General .
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raise the production level of other crops, especially sugar and indigo. 
To change agricultural production patterns is not easy, and the early 
years of the System saw intensive efforts to make adjustments in the 
administrative and productive arrangements on Java. This was not 
always successful, and compromises were continually made. In the 
years when van den Bosch himself was in Java (1830-1834) and when his 
close associate J. C. Baud succeeded him as Governor-General (1834- 
1836), there was a great deal of innovation, experimentation, and 
variation allowed. Later efforts to regularize the System never over­
came this beginning, and those who tended to see the System as a unit 
invariably found discrepancies which were then viewed as abuses or 
corruptions of the basic plan. Much of this pragmatism was of van den 
Boschfs creation and probably quite necessary to effect change. It 
may also have been necessary thereafter to bureaucratize the operation 
of the System.
Two essential elements of van den Bosch*s arrangements to get the 
production of various crops started were the introduction of percentage 
payments and the establishment of an Office of Cultivations. To in­
volve the Javanese and European administrators, a percentage of the 
value of the crops produced in their district was paid to them; in 
some areas this came to amount to more than the substantial salaries 
paid these officials. 7 The Office of Cultivations under a Director 
with a number of Inspectors in his charge was to supervise, regulate, 
and control the production of export crops, and also to make certain 
that the rural population was not unduly burdened, that is to say, in 
the parlance of the time, received proper benefits from the System. 8
When van den Bosch created the Office of the Director of Cultiva­
tions in 1831 the purpose was probably somewhat less clear than stated 
above. Perhaps it was to be little more than an agricultural experi­
mentation agency. The first Director of the Cultivations, J. I. van 
Sevenhoven, was an old Indies hand whose chief role may have been 
making the new chores palatable to some of the old time Residents and 
Regents. His agricultural advisers bordered on being charlatans, and 
the period he held office (1831-1833) witnessed unchecked latitude in 
local experimentation and/or indifference. It was under his successor, 
B. J. Elias, that the Office began to assume force and vigor in imple­
menting new cultivations and at the same time inspecting for abuses 
while allowing local variations. Elias had been Resident in Tjirebon 
prior to being selected as Director of Cultivations (1833-1836). He 
envisioned his new function as one of maintaining an equitable balance 
between the interests of the government and the welfare of the popula­
tion: a view which caused no small amount of disagreement with various
Residents, including his eventual successor to the Directorship, W. de 
Vogel.
7. R. Reinsma, "De Kultuurprocenten in de Praktijk en in de Ogen der 
Tijdgenoten," Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis (1959), pp. 57-83, 
provides an initial excursion into the question of the percentage 
payments.
8 . The function of the Director of Cultivations is officially described 
in Staatsblad van Nederlandsch IndiS, 1833, No. 73. He is to see 
that the System operated in accordance with the basic plan, protect 
the Javanese against abuses and make certain that they receive the 
benefits planned by the System, and direct all local efforts toward 
lightening the labor and increasing the income of the population.
After 1836 the Office of the Director of Cultivations began to 
change. Partly this was the result of the passing of the creative 
period and the beginning of bureaucratized procedures. The annual 
Cultivation Reports which had started in 1834 became more standardized 
after 1836, the Directors constantly complained about being burdened 
with paper work and having less and .less opportunity for first-hand 
observations, and the reports issuing from the office grew ever 
further in arrears until by the 1840’s the annual reports appeared as 
much as two years late. These surface phenomena would tend to indicate 
that the Office of Cultivations became less and less of an integral 
part of the productive process in Java and grew increasingly detached 
from the controls and regulations which it had originally been designed 
to oversee.
Behind this change lay a devolution of authority within the System 
to the local administrators. Van den Bosch’s efforts to maintain all 
decision-making power in his hands after his return to the Netherlands 
and elevation to Minister of Colonies in 1834 may have made it diffi­
cult for the colonial administration in Batavia to act forcibly. Also 
the mounting revenue needs in the Netherlands caused by the Belgian 
War forced all caution aside in an effort to expand the System. But 
possibly more decisive than either of these was the gradual develop­
ment of convenient arrangements, in the various areas where exportable 
crops were grown, between Javanese administrators, European civil 
servants, and European and Chinese entrepreneurs and supervisors.
Among these groups fortunes were made through percentage payments, 
underestimations of yields, and a growing private sector in the export 
of goods. There were fewer and fewer qualms about evading the rules 
of the System, heavier pressures on the cultivator, and a mounting 
disregard for the Office of Cultivations. 9
In practice after 1836 there was little possibility of the Dir­
ector of Cultivations doing much to affect local cultivation arrange­
ments. This is most cogently illustrated by the secret instructions 
issued to the Director of the Office of Cultivations in 1840. The 
Director was told not to interfere in existing local arrangements 
but instead to learn from the local authorities; moreover, he was to 
refrain from even discussing local land-rent arrangements and to 
avoid actions affecting work services or the socio-economic life of 
the Javanese villages. At most he might look about for areas in which 
government cultivations, especially indigo, might be expanded. 10 
Clearly the locus of regulation and control over the productive aspects 
of the System had devolved to the European and Javanese administrators 
in the residencies and regencies of Java. Local variations were per­
petuated and expanded, and the tfSystem,f became in actuality an inter­
locking set of local accommodations.
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9. L. Vitalis, De Invoering, Werking en Gebreken van het Stelsel van 
Kultures op Java (Zalt-Bommel: Noman, 1851), pp. 21-23, takes note 
of the changes in the System after 1836 much in the way that I 
have done in this paper. Most later writers on the System have 
made little use of Vitalis’ writings, feeling him perhaps to be 
too intimately tied to the founder of the System, and sharing too 
directly in the profits of the System, since he was assisted by 
the government in buying two sugar mills in Semarang in 1838. See 
Besluit, Gouv.-Gen., February 12, 1838, No. 11. Actually Vitalis’ 
function as inspector of cultivations made him an astute and 
critical observer of many aspects of the System.
10. Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, July 1 7 9 1840, La Ya.
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If the information and method applied in this paper have merit, 
it should be possible to discern differences in the operation of the 
System from one residency to the next, as well as variations in 
impact. To test this I have taken information from the annual Culti­
vation Reports from 1837 through 1851. In these years the content of 
the reports was standardized. They are to be found in complete form 
in the Archive of the Ministry of Colonies. 11 The fact that the 
reports probably had little influence upon production policies during 
these years does not diminish their historical value. The information 
they contain is no more or no less accurate because of this fact; the 
candor of some of the statements contained in the reports was indeed 
probably due to the fact that the reports had ceased to be feared 
as instruments of discipline or control.
The Cultivation Reports have been little used in any description 
or analysis of the Cultivation System. Primarily this is because they 
were classified up to 1839 and available only to high officials in 
the Ministry of Colonies thereafter. After 1851 some of the essential 
bits of information from the Reports were incorporated in the Koloniaal 
Verslag, but the earlier reports were not opened to the public until 
about the time of the Second World War. Gradually scholars began to 
locate them and use them. Then another problem arose; the size and 
detailed nature of the statistical information made it difficult to 
manipulate. To resolve this difficulty I had most of the information 
for the years 1837 through 1851 punched on computer cards. This 
information was then programmed to produce the various charts, tables, 
and ratios with which this paper works. This paper, however, uses 
only a fraction of the total information.
Before turning to the actual data, I shall add a few words about 
the over-all nature and content of a typical Cultivation Report. A 
Cultivation Report was an annual summary of the state of cultivations 
in Java, and was divided into sections dealing with: Agricultural
Establishments, Cinnamon, Cloves, Coffee, Corvee, Forestry, Gunny 
Sacks, Indigo, Livestock, Nopal and Cochineal, Pepper, Rice, Silk, 
Sugar, Tea and Tobacco. These sections do not necessarily appear 
in this order, or in any other order, and not every section appeared 
each year. Each section consists of text and statistical tables. The 
text, normally only a few pages, summarizes advances and declines, 
notes particular problems, and/or indicates future plans and projec­
tions. The statistical tables contain information on a residency 
basis. It should be noted that the residencies of Batavia (Djakarta), 
Buitenzorg (Bogor), Jogjakarta, and Surakarta were never incorporated 
into the Cultivation System and are, therefore, not included in any 
of the figures (including totals) used in this analysis. The statis­
tical tables contain information on such matters as: the number of
individuals and/or families involved in a particular cultivation or 
type of work, the land area and types of land used for a particular 
crop, the payments made to the population for crops grown for the 
government, the land-rent assessment on government fields as well as 
other fields, the costs of processing and transportation, and per­
centage payments to administrators, to mention but a few of the more
11. The Cultivation Reports are scattered in various folders of the 
Archive of the Ministry of Colonies which, for the years under 
consideration here, is located in the Rijksarchief, The Hague. 
Folio 3205 of this Archive contains a listing of the Cultivation 
Reports with their locations.
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important items. The charts accompanying the Rice sections provide 
the most comprehensive information on land, population, production, 
taxation, prices, etc. for each residency.
The set of charts in Table I shows relationships between land- 
rent assessments and the payments made by the government for crops.
These charts are first for Java as a whole (chart la), and then for 
four selected residencies (charts lb, Ic, Id, § Ie). The land-rent was 
the largest tax item for the rural Javanese as well as for the 
government; it was not the only tax, but it was the one most directly 
related to the cultivations. Payment for crops grown for the govern­
ment was far from being the only source of monetary income for the 
Javanese villager, but it represented, more than any other source, 
the benefit which the System was supposed to bring to the Javanese.
It will be immediately apparent that the total land-rent assess­
ment for the whole of Java on all cultivated fields generally ran 
below the payments made for all crops, including coffee, which were 
grown under the government's Cultivation System. The four selected 
residencies show markedly diverse patterns, and two of them, Semarang 
and Surabaja, have land-rent assessments which continually exceed 
the total payments for crops. The assessment on fields planted for the 
government ran continuously below the payments made for the crops grown 
on these fields, principally sugar and indigo, and, with the exception 
of Semarang, this was a rather large difference. This difference 
should represent the profit to the Javanese population directly in­
volved in the cultivation of government crops on their lands if only 
the two elements represented on these charts are taken into account.
It will also be seen from Table I that the land-rent assessment 
rose during the late 1830's and early 1840's, and began to level off, 
and even dip, after the middle of the 1840's. The payments made for 
government cultivations except coffee show a similar, albeit less 
pronounced, tendency. The inclusion of the coffee payments tends to 
diffuse this correlation, for coffee yields ran in natural cycles 
quite independent of governmental action. The charts reflect statis­
tically what every account of the Cultivation System has already 
indicated: namely, that the System ran into trouble in the mid 1840's.
These troubles are generally attributed to overextension, and their 
solution was sought in adjustments of land-rent assessments and 
reduction of areas in government cultivation. The charts for Bagelen 
(lb), Semarang (Ic) , and Tjirebon (Ie) show a sharper than normal 
adjustment; this corresponds with the reported severity of the problems 
in these particular residencies.
The charts in Table II are both more complex and less precise - 
than those in Table I. Essentially they represent a graphic rela­
tionship between the number of families and the area of land involved 
in government cultivations. To present this relationship graphically, 
the number of families liable to cultivation services and the extent 
of land used in the government cultivations are expressed in percentages 
of the total number of agricultural families and the total area of 
cultivated land respectively. The charts are for all of Java and for 
the same four selected residencies, and provide information for total 
crops as well as separately for indigo, sugar, and coffee. Since 
coffee was not grown on land otherwise cultivated, there is no line 
on the coffee charts for the percentage of cultivated land.
The imprecision of these charts is caused by the difficulty in 
obtaining accurate information about numbers of people or families and
TABLE I
i> -
K) a. ALL JAVA
Purchase price paid to 
population for:
o all government 
cultivations;
X all government
cultivations except 
coffee.
Gross land-rent 
assessment:
r on all cultivatedfields (incl. govt.);
/—  on fields planted for 
' the government only
c. SEMARANG
d. SURABAJA e. TJIREBON
0
TABLE II
^-Percentage of agricultural families involved in government re­
quired work for particular cultivations.
.. Percentage of sawah and tegalan fields used for cultivation of 
* government crops.
(Years from 1837 through 1851; Percentages, Zero to One Hundred)
ALL CROPS INDIGO SUGAR COFFEE
■1's zl
~7S
— —
—
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areas of land under cultivation in Java at the time with which we are 
concerned. Census and cadastral surveys were unknown; all figures 
were based on reportings from village officials to higher authorities. 
Virtually everyone who has used nineteenth-century Javanese figures 
has expressed cautions and doubts, and quite correctly so. It appears 
from my work with these statistics and by comparing them with spot 
checks and demographic regressions that a fairly constant divergence 
factor of 25 per cent below the actual amount can be applied to both 
the total number of families and the total area of land. The basis 
of this correction factor is explained in the appendix to this paper 
(see below, p. 107). Suffice it to note here that the charts in 
Table II are based on the actual figures as given. If the correction 
factor were applied it would lower the percentage of families and land 
used in government cultivations below that shown in the charts.
From the graphs in Table II it will be evident that the portion 
of cultivated land used for government cultivations was not a large 
portion of the total. Throughout the period government cultivations 
remain at about 5 per cent of the total land under cultivation. This 
is probably on the high side since this land was apt to be more 
accurately measured than was general village land in cultivation. The 
porportion of land in government cultivation runs higher in Bagelen 
and Tjirebon, a feature which is accounted for by the extent of land 
used in indigo cultivation.
What appears remarkable in light of the small land area is the 
high percentage of agricultural families involved in government cul­
tivations. It will be noticed from the upper left hand chart in 
Table II that the percentage of agricultural families involved in 
government cultivations for all of Java is in excess of 70 per cent 
for much of the period. For all of Java somewhat more than one half 
of these families were involved in coffee growing. But in Bagelen 
and Tjirebon the involvement in indigo production was also large, and 
in Surabaja sugar cane cultivation accounted for the largest portion. 
This high human involvement in the System begins to shed some light 
on the hitherto rather obscure element of labor service. However it 
was managed, there was a heavy concentration of labor brought to bear 
upon rather limited areas of land. Accounts of the time would lead 
to the conclusion that this labor force did not all appear at once, 
that there arose a group of people who for payment performed work 
services for others, and that not all the persons or families listed 
actually did field work. In general, the poor and propertyless seem 
to have borne the brunt of the work, but this had compensations which 
were not always expressed in monetary terms. 12
The high proportion of agricultural families involved in govern­
ment cultivations would tend to provide some explanation for the 
extremely low per capita payments made under the System for produce 
from government fields, for not only was the labor input far too large 
for even the most optimistic production schemes, but the large labor 
force was often wastefully used. Somewhat less directly evident, but
12. Day, Policy and Administration, p. 267, speculated on the emergence 
of a destitute class under the System. His evidence for this seems 
to rest entirely on van Soest's Geschiedenis, which would certainly 
indicate that all was not right with the System, but which would 
not give a very positive notion of the emergence of such a class 
at this time.
99
probably true nonetheless, is the frequently made observation both 
during and after the years of the Cultivation System that it encouraged 
communal landholding rather than individual holdings. Both the high 
human involvement in some villages and the rotation of lands in sugar, 
indigo, and tobacco areas would support this tendency, which was in 
any event a rather normal state of affairs for many parts of Java. 13 14
Whatever the truth of these contentions, it seems quite evident that 
the numbers of persons involved in the System, directly or indirectly, 
were extremely large, and that it is obviously in this area, rather 
than in the extent of land used, that the System had its most notice­
able effect in Java. Where these figures run especially high, as in 
Bagelen and Tjirebon, there are noticeable social effects as will be 
shown presently.
It would probably be useful to bring these labor figures somewhat 
into perspective by providing a brief explanation of the manner of 
cultivation and delivery used in the three major crops listed here: 
coffee, indigo, and sugar. The various forms of labor activity and 
possible extra compensations will not alter the figures, but may 
make them more understandable.
Coffee deliveries for little or no compensation had been imposed 
upon various districts in Java long before the Cultivation System 
was introduced, and in a strict sense coffee was not included in the 
schemes of van den Bosch. However, in a practical way it was not 
possible to exclude the largest revenue-producing crop from a total 
economic plan, and the Director of Cultivations included coffee in 
his reports from the outset. Van den Bosch did undertake to reform 
the existing system of coffee deliveries first by making monetary 
payments immediately upon delivery and directly to the cultivator 
or person who delivered the coffee rather than to headmen, and second 
by increasing the number of collection-payment stations, thereby re­
ducing the transportation distance for the coffee growers. 1 * Almost 
all persons, however they felt about other aspects of the Cultivation 
System, regarded these reforms as beneficent and clearly in the 
economic interest of the Javanese villager. In portions of the 
Preanger Regencies the custom of delivering coffee in lieu of the 
paddy assessment continued.
Coffee was grown in three ways, namely, in gardens, forests, and 
hedgerows. Only the agricultural families designated for work in 
gardens and forests are included in the totals of the Cultivation 
Reports and in the charts in Table II. Coffee gardens were planted 
in foothill and upland areas on land not used for other cultivations. 
Forest coffee consisted of plantings in the midst of forested areas,
13. A most perceptive insight into the nature of communal landholding 
and the regulation of village affairs in the middle of the nine­
teenth century is given by J . H. F. Sollewijn Gelpke, Naar 
Aanleiding van Staatsblad, 1878 , No. 110 (Batavia: 1901)",
pp. 7-9 and 24-28.
14. The basic coffee reforms came about through a resolution of August 
8 , 1832, No. 35, and later decrees. In the formulation of this 
policy van den Bosch had worked closely with Merkus; this was one 
of the few occasions on which the two men cooperated in these 
years. See S. van Deventer, Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het 
Landelijk Stelsel op Java (Zalt-Bommel: Noman, 1865-66), vol. II, 
pp. 526-527.
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where the coffee often did very well. For the planting and mainten­
ance of more than 200,000,000 coffee trees in Java during the 1840fs 
there were between 400,000 and 500,000 families designated as laborers. 
Constant planting was necessary, and between two and ten million new 
trees were planted annually, either to replace old trees or on newly 
opened areas. Whole families worked in various phases of the coffee 
growing; the work was generally seasonal. The remoteness of the 
coffee gardens and the primitive transportation system made the work 
more arduous than it would otherwise have been. The payment of seven 
to ten guilders per picul was great enough to provide some profit for 
most families, though this varied: in some areas as few as 75 trees
would yield a picul of coffee, while in other locations it took more 
than 300. Hedgerow coffee was grown along roads and paths in kampong 
areas as an extra source of income for villagers throughout Java.
Small amounts of indigo had been grown in Java since time im­
memorial, but extensive cultivation and preparation for export were 
introduced during the Cultivation System. The indigo plant was 
grown on non-irrigated fields, frequently those otherwise used for 
dry rice or secondary crops. From all reports, indigo growing and 
preparation became the most detested of the cultivations for the 
Javanese. There are three obvious reasons for this. The indigo 
plant exhausted the soil. After a few years neither indigo nor any 
other crop would grow on the land, and new areas, further from the 
village, had to be opened. Second, the preparation in small factories 
involved a fermentation process which required wading and sloshing 
in the vats with resultant discoloration of the skin. While such 
work was paid extra, it was not free of compulsion. Third, the pay­
ments to field workers were small to begin with, but the vast numbers 
of persons used in the cultivation made the individual payment 
minuscule. Indigo was not very profitable to the government either, 
and by the mid 1840fs the area in cultivation was cut back--many of 
the workers were turned into coffee growers--and gradually indigo 
planting was almost totally abandoned.
Sugar, also, had been grown in Java before 1830, chiefly around 
Batavia and in a few areas of East Java. The Cultivation System, 
however, extended the crop throughout the northern coastal plains of 
Java. Where it flourished, as in the Surabaja-Pasuruan area, it 
provided the basis for some prosperity for Javanese and a greal deal 
more for European and Chinese millers and exporters. Where it grew 
with difficulty and with low yields, as in Central Java, it created 
much work and less than the anticipated profits. Where it failed to 
grow, as in Bantam, it was soon abandoned. So far as the Cultivation 
System was concerned, the only obligation of the villager was to 
plant, tend, and cut the cane; it is this much of the process that is 
shown in both the payment and the number of families shown in the 
charts of Tables I and II. But clearly more had to happen before 
sugar could be exported. Such processes as transporting the cane 
from the field to the factory, working in the factory, and again 
transporting the refined sugar to the wharf, were all compensated, 
aside from the payments for the raw cane. These additional payments 
do not appear in the figures used here. Generally, transportation was 
arranged on a contractual basis with individuals, and there began to 
appear an independent group of transport entrepreneurs« Factory work 
was not always voluntary, even though additional pay was given; 
frequently factory labor was supplied through arrangements with 
village headmen, not unlike the compulsion used for field laborers.
Sugar cane was grown on irrigated rice fields which were taken 
out of production for a year or eighteen months in order to accommodate
101
the new crop. The growing cycle came, in many areas, to be accommodated 
within the rice pattern of production, and as village lands were ex­
tended and new areas brought into irrigation, there developed vast 
tracts of alternating paddy and cane cultivation. In such areas more 
than one-fifth of a village's lands were devoted to cane; this brought 
about very complicated land swaps. Also in these areas the villages 
became heavily dependent upon the extra monetary income from the 
various stages of growing and processing the sugar; this dependence 
produced social and economic changes within the village which were 
difficult to control either from within or from without.
To carry forward our analysis of the charts in Tables I and II,
I would like to introduce two further sets of relationships based on 
the statistical data from the Cultivation Reports. Table II shows 
the percentage of agricultural families employed in various cultiva­
tions during the years 1837 through 1851, but the charts tell us 
nothing about the absolute total of agricultural families as it might 
have changed over the period in question. If we express this rise 
and fall of the number of agricultural families at the beginning, 
mid-point, and end of our period as percentages of the numbers at the 
beginning of the period, we are presented with the following figures:
Beginning Mid-Point End
All Java 1 0 0% 109% 103!
Bagelen 1 0 0% 98% 69!
Semarang 1 0 0% 115% 97!
Surabaj a 1 0 0% 116% 140!
Tj irebon 1 0 0% 107% 80!
Nor do the charts in Table II provide us with information about 
the relationship between the total number of agricultural families and 
the total amount of land in cultivation. Using again the beginning, 
mid-point, and end of our fifteen year period, and dividing the total 
units15 of land in cultivation by the total number of agricultural 
families (obtaining thereby the average amount of cultivated land per 
agricultural family), we obtain the following set of figures.
Beginning Mid-Point End
All Java 1.13 1.14 1.42
Bagelen .9 1.0 2 . 0
Semarang 1.5 1 . 6 2 . 8
Surabaj a 1.7 1.5 1.4
Tj irebon 1.0 1.5 2 . 0
These figures give an indication both of rising population and 
increased amounts of cultivated land for all Java. Contemporary 
accounts constantly refer to the opening of new lands through the 
extension of irrigation channels, the draining of coastal swamps, and 
the clearing of new lands. It would appear that the amount of land 
in cultivation increased somewhat more rapidly than the number of 
agricultural families, but not too much should be made of this because 
of the difficulty in enumeration. The labor involved in opening and
15. The unit of land measurement was the bouw (bau or bahu) which varied 
in size from one part of Java to another, but which was standarized 
in the Cultivation Reports as an areal measurement of 500 square 
rods.
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improving agricultural lands was in large part included in the culti­
vation work for which the families in Table II were designated. This 
could be extremely hard work, and was reflected in the compensation 
and production patterns only at a future date if at all.
The number of agricultural families seems to have increased 
slowly for all of Java, but to have decreased in three of the four 
residencies examined here. Contemporary accounts frequently speak 
of villagers, sometimes whole villages, moving, so the trends shown 
here need not be surprising. Part of this mobility was undoubtedly 
into towns and cities, which would mean statistically that the 
migrant family would drop out of the agricultural count but would 
eventually be picked up again in the total population count. Some 
of the movement was into unoccupied or formerly abandoned areas, 
principally in East Java, which had been depopulated in the wars 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries culminating 
in the Java War of 1825-1830. The population line, like the land- 
rent line in Table I, moves slowly upward to the mid 1840’s and then 
declines slightly. The poor harvests and accompanying epidemics of 
the 1840*s, especially severe in the Semarang-Demak-Rembang area, 
are generally cited as a cause of this trend, and they undoubtedly 
had an effect. The extent of family mobility, however, probably 
also put a strain on the primitive counting methods of the time.
From an examinination of the trends of population and land in 
the four selected residencies, it appears that Surabaja runs counter 
to the other three. In regard to the number of agricultural families 
it is the only residency to show an increase during the period. 
Semarang and Tjirebon show a rise into the mid-1840fs, then a decline 
below the beginning point. Bagelen displays a constant decline 
throughout the period.
These trends tend to confirm, and to be confirmed by, the charts 
in Tables I and II as well as by the reports of the time. In Bagelen, 
for instance, the burdensome nature of the indigo cultivation has 
already been noted. It is not surprising that families and villages 
left the area or made themselves scarce. The continuously heavy 
labor involvement shown in the Bagelen charts in Table II meant, of 
course, a steady decrease in absolute numbers since the number of 
agricultural families was absolutely decreasing. The decreasing land 
area devoted to indigo in Bagelen (Table II) reflects this trend too, 
but the over-all decline in the number of agricultural workers is 
less than would be anticipated in Bagelen because of transference out 
of indigo into the expanding coffee cultivations.
One feature of the Semarang chart, Table Ic, which needs some 
clarification, is the unusual rise in the assessment of fields planted 
for the government in the mid-1840fs. Coming at a time when epidemics 
and famine were prevalent in the area and total agricultural families 
were declining, this may seem very strange indeed. Indeed, it should 
for it reveals a clear case of maladministration in which the local 
Resident and his staff were attempting to cover up a mismanaged situa­
tion by throwing additional burdens on the assessments on government 
fields. Assessments on government fields rose to 27 per cent of 
total assessments with less than 2 per cent of the total cultivated 
area planted for the government. This was a desperate effort to cover 
losses on abandoned fields caused by population movements and deaths, 
and to offset losses from a futile and costly effort to introduce 
tobacco cultivation. Chart Ic shows some rather hasty readjustments 
in the residency after 1847; tobacco areas were reduced, land-rent
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assessments were lowered, large irrigation schemes were undertaken, 
and the labor involvement in sugar cane cultivation was slowly in­
creased. The local administration, both European and Javanese, 
was also shaken up.
In both Semarang and Tjirebon the statistical patterns and the 
contemporary reports have a certain similarity. The introduction of 
indigo in Tjirebon and sugar cane in Semarang did not go especially 
well. Extensive draining of swamps along the coast and opening of 
new lands occurred in both areas. Lack of profit and heavy labor re­
quirements drove people off the land and out of compulsory government 
service. Apparently the movement off the land was principally into 
the major towns and city of each residency, for the total population 
in both regions remained rather constant despite the marked decline 
in agricultural population. This is quite unlike the Bagelen situa­
tion where both total population and agricultural population declined.
Only in Surabaja does the number of agricultural families increase 
constantly and sharply, so sharply that an inward migration can be 
the only explanation. The lighter than average involvement in govern­
ment cultivations, as shown in Table II, and the prospering sugar 
industry would appear to be significant contributing factors. The 
lack of any reported food or disease crisis in the Surabaja area 
during this period must also be noted. The increase shown in 
Surabaja is similar to the patterns for the residencies of Pasuruan 
and Besuki, both expanding sugar areas. The residencies of Kediri 
and Madiun also show a similar, albeit less pronounced, trend. By 
contrast, all residencies in Central Java seem to have lost agricul­
tural population. 16
Turning to the relationship between the area of cultivated land 
and the number of agricultural families, we note from figures on 
p. 1 0 1 that the area of land per family was gradually increasing 
throughout the period for all Java. This increase is reflected in 
exaggerated fashion in three of the four sample residencies; only 
Surabaja is moving in the other direction. The over-all increase 
for all Java is about 125 per cent while that for Semarang is 
185 per cent, Tjirebon 200 per cent, and Bagelen 220 per cent. This 
is naturally related to the movement off the land in these three 
areas which, along with the addition of newly opened lands, meant 
that there was increasingly more cultivated land per family. Or, 
seen from another perspective, there were less people to work more 
land as time went on. Surabaja shows the steady decrease in the area 
of cultivated land per agricultural family to be expected in light 
of the inward migration. Also the actual expansion of cultivated 
lands in Surabaja was less than in the other three residencies. More­
over, the growing reliance of agricultural families in the sugar
16. The statistical information for all residencies has been worked 
out, but is not included in this paper. Where reference is made 
to contemporary accounts, the text portion of the Cultivation 
Reports is generally meant. However, such accounts as van Soestfs 
Geschiedenis and van Deventer’s Bijdragen are compendia of de­
tails about famine and disease (attributed to the System), abuses, 
brutalities, and stupidities which led to the abandonment of 
certain areas as well as less sizeable movements of populations.
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producing areas upon land rentals to sugar producers and upon paid 
work in the sugar industry, may well have made it possible to con­
centrate more people on smaller amounts of land.
From all of this it would appear that the amount of land avail­
able was perhaps less important to an agricultural family than the 
amount of imposed labor required by the government and/or the profit­
ability of particular types of work. The availability of agricultural 
land in Bagelen, Semarang, and Tjirebon may have been a contributing 
factor in the individualization of landholding which is noted in 
these areas later in the century. While the interpretation of the 
data produced by the investigation launched in the 1860fs into 
Javanese rights in land awaits careful analysis, it is quite evident 
that communal holdings were strongest in East Java and the interior 
regions of Central Java, while individual landholdings arrangements 
prevailed in West Java and along the central north coast. 17 The 
rather easy availability of land in Bagelen, Semarang, and Tjirebon 
may have led to concentration of landholding by families which could 
either escape or manage the imposed services that accompanied control 
of land. Administrative families as well as village headmen were 
freed of such obligations, and it is possible that for such groups 
their privileged position would allow a gradual shift in economic 
patterns.
An interesting question which our data does not touch upon but 
which seems relevant to understanding the relationships expounded 
here, is the extent to which cultivation services were turned to 
other ends and the extent to which other service obligations continued. 
Technically both were violations of the System as originally conceived, 
but both happened and seem to have become regularized. Large govern­
ment projects such as road works, factory construction, and the 
building of fortifications continued to draw on labor which was levied 
under corvee arrangements supposedly equated with, not imposed in 
addition to, cultivation work. Forced labor imposed by village head­
men and higher officials, except for village guard duty and local 
maintenance, was supposed to cancel out cultivation obligations, and 
to be specially provided for from particular villages which were 
freed from cultivation work. But there are many indications that 
large amounts of labor were used on personal projects by both European 
and Javanese civil servants. This question is too complex to be 
unravelled here. Suffice it to note that the burden of obligatory 
service could mount up considerably in some areas, and, quite apart 
from any particular crop or type of land usage, the personal quirks 
of the local administration which had virtually a free hand in such 
matters was of considerable importance in determining the quality 
of life of the agriculturist.
A number of observations should be made to clarify certain 
aspects of the problems raised here. Van den Bosch had assumed
17. Eindresum6 van het Onderzoek naar de Rechten van den Inlander,
3 vols. (Batavia: Ernst, 1876, 1880 , and 1896) , makes the local 
variations in landholding arrangements quite explicit. The re­
port was so long in preparation that it had little effect upon 
the land conversion arrangements toward individual holdings 
which the government started in the late nineteenth century. The 
wealth of substantive data contained in this report has hardly 
been touched by scholars.
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that his plan would bring increased welfare and prosperity to the 
Javanese, In the main, despite shortfalls in some areas, the System 
did that. By all material bases of calculation such as area of land 
under cultivation per family, amount of livestock per family, and 
availability and price of basic food commodities it would appear 
that material well-being was growing more rapidly than the population 
during the period under consideration here. But this is a very 
generalized observation and says nothing about the manner in which 
these material gains were distributed among the population.
From Table I it is clear that the payments made to the population 
for crops grown for the government were more than enough to pay the 
land-rent assessment on the lands on which government crops were 
grown. But that was not the purpose of the System; it was supposed 
to provide enough to pay the total land-rent assessment. In a few 
localities this occurred, but it was more the exception than the 
rule. Moreover, if we view the amount of payment for crops in rela­
tion to the number of agricultural families involved, then the payment 
per family was minuscule. But it is not at all clear that payments 
were made on a per family basis. In some areas such individualized 
payments were introduced by European administrators, but much more 
common was payment on a village basis, or, to put it differently, 
a reduction in the land-rent owed by the village by the amount of 
the crop payment. In actuality, then, many families received no 
benefits unless they were included among the village landholders.
There are indeed indications that in many villages landholding rights 
were extended to a broader segment of the population under the 
Cultivation System than had previously been the case. Such indications 
lie behind the assumption, probably correct, that the System en­
couraged communal landholding arrangements in many areas.
It is perhaps not surprising that the land-rent assessment on 
fields planted for the government was on the average higher than on 
the remaining fields. Chart la shows that the land-rent assessment 
on government fields ran at about 1 2 per cent of the total, while 
the extent of such fields, as shown in the upper left hand chart 
of Table II, was generally less than 6 per cent of the total cultivated 
area. The statistics are again confirmed by contemporary observations 
which tell us that fields planted in sugar cane were always assessed 
at the highest rate regardless of what their classification might have 
been when planted in paddy. 18 It also follows logically that since 
fields planted for the government were more accurately measured and 
supervised the assessment discrepancy would be even greater.
There is probably little doubt that such matters as described 
here ran counter to the original plan of van den Bosch, but they did 
exist and did grow worse as time went on. They form an essential 
aspect of the pressure of the System upon the Javanese cultivator 
and the tendency of the System to effect social changes in Javanese 
society. Van den Bosch undoubtedly succeeded in raising the material 
level of Javanese society. The System in its own way undoubtedly 
bestowed privilege and benefit upon a small segment of Javanese 
society, but there was very little done to promote the sense of 
enterprise and personal endeavor among the Javanese. That was not, 
of course, van den Bosch’s purpose. Javanese society was supposed to
18. R. W. J. C. Bake, Kunnen en Moeten er Veranderingen Gebragt Worden 
in het Kultuurstelsel op Java (Utrecht: Dekema, 1854), p. 22.
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remain constant and content; it was not meant to develop any dynamism. 
Moreover, there was an underlying assumption that the Javanese culti­
vator was not influenced by normal economic stimuli--an assumption 
that would appear rather far off the mark if the evidence presented 
in this paper has any validity. Whatever the aims of the System in 
preserving Javanese society in stasis, they were not successful. 
Javanese society did change, did develop new social and economic re­
lationships, and did apparently undergo population shifts. It is 
also a fact that the profits from the cultivation of crops for the 
government which the Javanese did not make were being made by others, 
namely the European and Chinese mill owners, importers and exporters, 
and especially, of course, the government itself.
The period of the 1830's, just prior to the years covered by the 
statistical evidence used in this paper, seems to me a most critical 
time in the development of the System. In the early 1830fs there 
had been some efforts to involve the Javanese cultivator more directly 
in the System. Labor arrangements, for instance, were originally 
conceived as contractual rather than forced. This did not work well, 
partly due to impatience and pressures for money from the European 
side, partly due to socio-economic disabilities among the Javanese.
In some areas, such as Djepara, there were early efforts to involve 
the Javanese in the processing side of the System. These efforts too 
were soon abandoned, owing to stronger Chinese capital, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, failure to maintain quality control. 19 
Schemes to involve some of the Javanese prijaji upper class in mill­
ing and production contracts also failed. After 1836 no further ef­
forts were made in this direction, and the role and function of the 
Javanese was relegated to what seemed to work best, namely traditional 
authority controlling unthinking labor. The System, as I have said 
above, became entrenched in local arrangements, and as it began to 
show profits, it became less and less possible to tamper with its 
production features. There was by now no longer room for the Javanese, 
other than the) administrators, to seek a future within the cultivation 
aspects of the System. There was no device within the System for 
absorbing the socio-economic or cultural changes which emerged. Only 
in fringe areas was this possible. Transportation contracts, arrange­
ments for delivery of subsidiary materials, supervisory functions in 
fields and mills, and other types of jobs developed around the govern­
ment cultivations. For many others movement into the towns and cities 
provided an entry either into paid employment or into an expanding 
internal commercial sector which provided commodities for the growing 
market economy on Java. This market economy was in large part expanded 
through the growing communication network and the increased monetiza­
tion of economic life made necessary by the System.
From an economic point of view the growing profits to individuals 
and to the government produced by the System came largely from more 
efficient processing of sugar and the continued marketability of 
coffee. This could occur without altering arrangements for cultiva­
tion or payment with the population. The charts in Table II indicate 
quite clearly that the area of land under government cultivation was 
diminishing, while the number of families with an obligation for 
cultivation service remained constant. It would appear that the size 
of the labor force bore little relationship to the economic functioning
19. R. Van Niel, "The Regulation of Sugar Production in Java, 1830- 
1840 ," in R. Van Niel, ed., Economic Factors in Southeast Asian 
Social Change (Honolulu: Asian Studies Program, University of 
Hawaii Press, 1968), pp. 91-108.
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of the System. I suspect that the amount of available labor that 
became tied to prestige functions of Javanese and European adminis­
trators became ever greater. By the end of the period which we are 
considering here there was probably more abuse in the area of diverting 
services to personal ends than there was in the way of overwork in the 
actual cultivation of crops.
Conclusion
Most of the statistical evidence presented in this paper has tended 
to confirm and substantiate the accounts of the Cultivation System as 
obtained from other sources. We have certainly not presented a radical 
revision of the generally accepted story. Moreover, this type of 
evidence seems most convincing and is most illuminating when used in 
conjunction with other kinds of material. At most, the data has high­
lighted certain developments such as the extent to which the popula­
tion was involved in the System and the degree of population mobility 
in Java. These are not new concepts, but the fashion in which they 
are presented here may make them more rigorous, and by so doing may 
place some of the changes in Javanese society in sharper perspective. 
This type of supporting and reinforcing role is probably the most 
that should be hoped for or expected.
It is my feeling that this is sufficient to warrant a continuation 
of the method of inquiry. Information on rice prices, paddy yields, 
wages, livestock, and many other items are available in the Cultiva­
tion Reports for the period covered in this paper. Much of this type 
of data continued to appear in later periods in the Koloniaal 
Verslag. Some records below the residency level may still be in 
existence and may become available to future historians. 20 Such 
records can provide exciting insights into local variations, and can 
perhaps advance our understanding of the process of social change. 
Historians will hopefully be able to use the records as a whole to 
tell a story of social, economic and cultural change in Java which 
will include the Javanese population whose own records of mundane 
events scarcely exist. The present effort to do this is rather 
gross, in keeping with the nature of the evidence, but one can hope 
for future refinements.
Appendix
The Cultivation Reports for the years covered here (1837-1851) 
contain figures on total population on a residency basis. The total 
population for all reported residencies rose from 6,282,848 in 1837 
to 7,386,802 in 1851. These figures were derived from village and 
district reports compiled by local officials whose interests lay in 
under-reporting, but whose capacity to do this was limited by sight 
estimates by European and higher Javanese officials. The residencies 
of Batavia (Djakarta), Buitenzorg (Bogor), Jogjakarta, and Surakarta 
were not included in these figures. It was customary among officials
20. R. Van Niel, A Survey of Historical Source Materials in Java and 
Manila (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 19 70) , p. 12.
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at the time to estimate the population of these excluded areas at 
about two million persons. If this amount is added to the population 
figure for 1851 we achieve a total population for all Java of about 
9.3 million persons which is very close to the officially reported 
figure of 9.5 million given in the Koloniaal Verslag for 1850.
I cannot explain why Dr. P. Bleeker, whose investigations into 
the population of Java began in the mid-1840's and whose figures are 
used by all demographers for this period, made no use of the figures 
in the Cultivation Reports. 21 The Cultivation Reports do not show as 
high a rate of growth as Bleeker and others tended to assume, but 
this more moderate growth rate for the period under consideration 
seems to accord more closely with the feelings of contemporary demo­
graphers about Java's population during the early nineteenth century.
No one, then or now, would regard any of the nineteenth century 
figures as accurate. The question is, how inaccurate are they? 
Through working backwards from later data, Breman estimates that the 
population of Java in 1850 must have been about 12.5 million, while 
Peper prefers a figure closer to 13.1 million. 22 234 The difference is 
attributable to various estimates about the rate of population growth 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Widjojo prefers to 
make no estimates for lack of accurate evidence (for which he cannot 
be blamed), but questions any population growth to speak of in the 
nineteenth century. This latter supposition is completely unsupport- 
able. It seems to rest on nothing more than an exaggerated reading 
of Gonggrijp, whose already exaggerated account of the effects of 
the Cultivation System is generally recognized as an overreaction by 
an economic liberal to a system of restriction and state control 
The fact is that the studies of Breman and Peper provide us with 
some estimates which, if used cautiously, can give us a working model 
of Javanese population configurations in the nineteenth century.
If we accept Breman's figure of 12.5 million persons as the 
approximate population of Java in 1850, and take the figure of 9.3 
million as the sum of the total obtained from the Cultivation Reports 
and the uncounted residencies, for about the same date, we note that 
the latter figures are about 75 per cent of the former. Van der Wijk 
reports on a population reassessment check in Tjirebon in 1844 in 
which the population proved to be 145,000 instead of a reported 
105,000; this would mean that in this instance only 72 per cent of 
the actual total had been reported.21*
21. P. Bleeker, "Statistisch-Ekonomische Onderzoekingen en Beschouwingen 
op Koloniaal Gebied: Over de Bevolkingstoename op Java," Tijdschrift 
Voor Nederlandsch Indig, nieuwe serie I (1863), pp. 193-T5T]
22. J. C. Breman, "Java: Bevolkingsgroei en Demografische Structuur,"
Drie Geografische Studies over Java (Leiden: Brill, 1963), pp. 252- 
308, esp. 267-269; Bram Peper, Grootte en Groei van Java's
Inheemse Bevolking in de Negentiende Eeuw (Amsterdam: Anthropologisch- 
Sociologisch Centrum, Publikatie Nr. 11, 1967), esp. pp. 112-119.
23. Widjojo Nitisastro, Population Trends in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1970) , chapter 3.
24. H. C. van der Wijck, Eenige Beschouwingen over Java (Arnhem:
Nijhoff, 1851), pp. 42-48.
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The Cultivation Reports also provide information on the extent 
of land area under cultivation. Again these figures are derived from 
village headmen and local officials, and again there were clear 
advantages to under-reporting. Dutch officials in Java at the time 
were quite aware of this practice, and made some spot checks to 
determine how far off reported land areas were from the reality.
One such check in Tjirebon in 1842 led Governor-General Merkus to 
report that the 1,515,436 bouw reported in that residency was about 
500,000 bouw short of the mark.25 The reported amount was thus 
about 75 per cent of the actual total. In 1836 a random sampling 
of villages in Tjirebon, Pekalongan, and Tegal showed that a reported 
cultivated area of 990 bouw was in actuality 1380 bouw--meaning that 
only 72 per cent of the true amount of cultivated land was 
reported.26
It should be noted in both instances that this factor of under­
reporting ranging from 72 to 75 per cent of the rechecked totals for 
both population and cultivated land, works only for rather large 
aggregates. It is often not relevant to figures for a single village. 
For the large aggregates, however, I have found it to be fairly con­
sistent for the period covered by this paper.
Whatever the merits or demerits of applying any such factor to 
the adjustments of statistical errors in the pertinent data con­
tained in the Cultivation Reports, it should be noted that this was 
not done in the present analysis; here all calculations are based 
upon figures exactly as contained in the Cultivation Reports.
25. Letter from Gouv.-Gen. P. Merkus to the Minister of Colonies,
dd. Buitenzorg, April 22, 1844, Geheim, Kabinet no. 85. Archive, 
Ministry of Colonies.
26. Van Deventer, Bijdragen, vol. Ill, report of P. F. Clignett, 
pp. 45-63; see esp. the chart on p. 64.
